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Summary
Transshipment is widely adopted in multiple location inventory management. We
study a two-location logistics system. Each location holds a certain amount of
perishable products before the selling season. Leftover inventory after the selling
season would have no value. The demand at each location is assumed to be an
independent random variable. At most one transshipment is allowed within the
selling season.
We first study a centralized controlled system. We prove that the expected
revenue function is concave with respect to the transshipment amount at any
point of time. The optimal decision process is developed to determine the initial
order quantity for each location, the time to conduct transshipment and the trans-
shipment amount. In our numerical experiments, we examine the performance of
the newsboy heuristic for the initial order quantity decision. We also conduct
sensitivity analysis for certain parameters in our model.
The model is further investigated from the supply chain coordination aspect.
We study a decentralized system with two decision makers. We find that the
system-wide revenue shrinks along with the transshipment amount in a decentral-
ized system. The transshipment deal may also fail if either party finds it to be
nonprofitable for him to conduct the transshipment.
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The life cycle of electronic devices shrinks significantly due to the continuous
update of new technology. Once the management board decides to promote a
new product, the company would try to push such a product to the very end
of the supply chain, the retail stores, to make it easily accessed by consumers.
However, with little demand information for this new product, the decision maker’s
forecasting may not be accurate. The inventory levels among retail stores would
become unbalanced as time goes by. Some stores may face strong demand while
some others can sell only a few.
The same problem haunts other industries in which retailers sell perishable
products with short selling seasons. For example, due to the fierce competition
in fashion and leisure industry, many brands need to open several stores in urban
area and provide all sizes for various styles in each store. With so many SKUs to
manage, it is quite often to incur stock out in one store while some other stores
worry about the unsold piles in their warehouses for certain types of clothes.
Transshipment policy can be adopted to alleviate inventory imbalance. The
1
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decision maker can balance the inventory level among retailers through redistri-
bution of on-hand stock among all locations. Additional revenue can be gained
by a better match between demand and inventory whereas logistics cost is paid.
Sometimes retailers operate on their own if they are not under the same par-
ent company. Since these retailers are selling the same or similar products to
consumers, they are most likely to be competitors. Even if some retailers want
to sell part of their stocks and some others are willing to buy, those deals can be
hardly made due to their dispute in contract. Such dispute usually stems from
conflicting objectives: each player is only concerned with his own profit. In a
decentralized two-location model in which each retailer does business separately,
both players may find transshipment mutually beneficial. A deal may still not be
made if the additional revenue is not split appropriately.
In the modern competitive market, it is no longer wise for a company to control
every aspects of the supply chain, from the procurement of the raw materials to
the selling of products to customers. A modern supply chain is usually composed
of several members: the supplier of the raw material, the manufacturer, the re-
tailer and sometimes the third party logistics company. In terms of limited capital,
technology and human resources, each firm in supply chain can only focus on its
core business to survive, grow and thrive among horizonal competitors. Vertically,
members in the same supply chain need to coordinate to increase each member’s
payoff. Theoretically, companies should agree on such a mechanism which makes
the supply chain reach global optimization. However, it is very difficult to imple-
ment such a mechanism given the conflicting objectives of different parties. Each
member basically places its own benefit with the highest priority, which usually
leads to a suboptimal performance of the supply chain.
To reach global optimization, members in the same supply chain need to coop-
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erate with each other. One tool to force each member to do what exactly benefits
the global performance is to use contracts. As is stated by Cachon [13], “A contract
is said to coordinate the supply chain if the set of supply chain optimal actions
is Nash equilibrium, i.e., no firm has a profitable unilateral deviation from the
set of supply chain optimal actions.” A well-designed contract can regulate each
party’s activity in a decentralized supply chain by synchronizing local optimality
with global optimality.
1.2 Motivation
Numerous research works have been done in the transshipment problem. Allen [1]
and Gross [23] assumed that transshipment occurs before the selling season. Kar-
markar [31], Karmarkar [32] and Robinson [40] assumed that transshipment oc-
curs after demand is observed but before it must be met. Those arbitrary policies
may not be optimal. Proactive transshipment is conducted with little demand
information. Reactive transshipment usually does not consider the setup cost in
transportation. Archibald et al. [5] and Grahovac and Chakravarty [22] studied
the transshipment problem based on lot-for-lot policy. They still did not take the
setup cost into account.
The first part of our study (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) investigates the batch
transportation problem within the selling season. For slower movers, lot-for-lot is
applicable because of the low demand rate and low frequency of transshipment.
For fast-moving products, however, batch transportation is commonly adopted to
save the setup cost.
The fast-changing market also requires quick reaction from the decision maker.
Our model incorporates the time factor with the transshipment amount and initial
ordering. Unlike previous researches, most of which only focus on several specific
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decisions, our study covers the entire decision making process and provides the
optimal solution for each stage. Simulation method can be adopted when the
scale of the problem is too large, which makes the computation for the theoretical
optimal solution quite time consuming.
The second part of our study (Chapter 5) studies the lateral collaboration
problem in a decentralized system. Cachon [13] provided a comprehensive review
on the subject of supply chain coordination. While most researchers studying
supply chain coordination are focusing on the interaction between supplier and
retailer, or vertical integration (Splengler [44]), we examine the dual role of the
retailer in a lateral supply chain. The retailer may send out stock to the other
retailer and sell the same product to consumers at the same time. Our study shows
that both retailers can benefit from such cooperation. Small retailers with limited
capital may not be able to invest much in supply chain management. They may
need to cooperate with the third party logistics companies and other members in
supply chain.
1.3 Purpose of the Study
One of the purposes in this study is to provide the optimal operational solution
to the two-location transshipment problem. The policy consists of three decision
variables: initial order quantity, time of transshipment and transshipment amount.
For the initial order decision, exhaustive search can provide the optimal solution.
The time of transshipment is determined by the evaluation process within the
selling season. Transshipment amount is obtained by the first order condition
since the objective function is concave.
Theoretical computation can be time consuming while the scale of problem
becomes large, especially for the initial order decision. We propose a newsboy
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
heuristic, which can provide decent solution in our numerical study. Simulation
can be deployed to speed up the evaluation process while determining the trans-
shipment time.
The other purpose is to bring the concept of supply chain coordination in a
lateral supply chain. Our study shows that generally the decision makers in a
decentralized supply chain would not make global optimal decision. We also find
that two parties may not reach the transshipment deal because of the dispute
in revenue sharing. Failure of transshipment may also affect the system-wide
performance.
1.4 Organization
This thesis consists of six chapters. We review the relevant literature in Chapter
2. The literature review includes two streams of study: transshipment and supply
chain coordination.
Chapter 3 introduces a basic two-location transshipment model with a finite
time horizon. We first analyze the transshipment policy in the operational level,
when and how much should we transship the inventory between these two loca-
tions. After obtaining the optimal operation policy, we deduce the optimal initial
ordering quantities by enumerating all possible demand realizations.
Chapter 4 presents the numerical example results. We investigate how the unit
margin and the demand rate affect the initial ordering decision and the effect of
transshipment. We also investigate a newsboy heuristics, in which the decision
maker places initial orders based on the traditional newsboy model while ignoring
the impact from transshipment. Since the search for optimal order quantity is
quite time consuming in a large scale problem, we use simulation to develop a
searching heuristic for a symmetric case. Simulation method can also be deployed
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to cope with a large scale problem in practice.
Chapter 5 highlights the issue of lateral supply chain collaboration. In this
chapter, we consider a decentralized version of the two-location transshipment
model. Two retailers make their decisions respectively. Both of them want to
maximize their own revenue. We show that the system-wide expected profit in
the decentralized system is less than that in the centralized system.




The research work in this thesis is related to two main streams of literature. The
first stream of literature focuses on the modeling and optimization on centralized
controlled transshipment models. Those papers assume that there is only one
decision maker in the system and the only aim is to maximize the profit or minimize
the cost. The second stream of research studies the supply chain coordination
problem. Researchers usually assume two or more players in a system. Each
player is only concerned with his own goal. Many papers successfully design
various contracts to coordinate the supply chain, i.e, to provide incentives for all
players make decisions leading to global optimality.
2.1 Transshipment Problem
In this section, we review the literature on the subject of centralized controlled
transshipment problem. We categorize the literature in transshipment problem
based on the time to conduct transshipment.
7
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2.1.1 Proactive Transshipment
If the transshipment is conducted before the selling season starts, we call it proac-
tive transshipment. The transshipment model can be tracked back to the work
of Allen [1]. He considered a n location model with normal distributed demand.
In this periodically replenished model, he assumes that existing procurement and
allocation policies can be relied upon to correct basic stock inadequacies over the
long term. Allen also took the setup cost into account. In a following paper,
Allen [2] elaborated the computation process, including whether the transship-
ment should be conducted and the transshipment amount among locations.
Gross [23] considered a two-location problem in which transshipment occurs
before the stochastic demands realize. In a two-location model with replenishment
and transshipment opportunities, Gross highlighted four system possibilities. He
analyzed each of them and provides the optimal solution.
2.1.2 Arbitrary Transshipment Time
Das [19] considered a two-location model facing stochastic demand. Transship-
ment occurs in the middle of the selling season. Under certain regularity condi-
tions, both the optimal transfer rule and the optimal ordering rule were developed.
Jonsson and Silver [30] arbitrarily set the time of transshipment before the last
period of order cycle. They demonstrated that a model with redistribution can
provide the same service level with less initial inventory compared with a model
without redistribution. Bertrand and Bookbinder [11] extended the model into
nonidentical cost retailers.
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2.1.3 Reactive Transshipment
When transshipment activity is triggered by certain event, we name it as reactive
transshipment. Hadley and Whitin [24] considered a n-locations model with Pois-
son distributed demand. They considered two kinds of transshipment model, fast
and slow, with different lead times. For each location, they selected two critical
probabilities, αsj and αfj, of one or more back orders in the slow and fast redis-
tribution lead times, respectively. Each αsj(αfj) determines an on-hand inventory
Msj(Mfj), outlet 2 is at its critical probability level. The order policy for this
infinite time model is (R,Q), once the system inventory level hits R, an order of
Q items will be placed.
Axsater [6] studied a two echelon logistics system with repairable items. Gra-
hovac and Chakravarty [22] adopted one-for-one inventory policies in which a
replenishment order is placed as soon as the customer withdraws an item.
Axsater [7] studied a single-echelon inventory system consisting of a number
of paralleled warehouses facing compound Poisson demand. In this infinite time
horizon model, he adopted the (R,Q) policy in which R is the reorder point and
Q is the batch order. Fixed replenishment lead time has been taken into account.
Zhao et al. [51] considered a two-dealer inventory sharing system. Each dealer
adopts an (S,K) policy, in which S is the reorder point and K is the rationing
level to accept demand from the other dealer.
The most relevant paper is Archibald et al. [5]. Although they considered
an infinite time horizon model with periodic review policy, the detailed analysis
about transshipment has been made within each subperiod. Archibald et al. used
Poisson distributed demand to take time factor into account.
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2.1.4 Transshipment after Observing Demand
Most of the literature assume that transshipment occurs after demand is realized
but it must be satisfied. Karmarkar [31, 32] and Robinson [40] all fall into this
category.
Robinson [40] considered a n-location model with finite time horizon with
multiple periods. One important finding in this paper is that if the optimal base
stock order-up-to point is attainable in any period, then it will be attainable in
all remaining periods.
Tagaras and Cohen [45] took the deterministic lead time into an transshipment
model with two retailers. They divide the time horizon into small periods. The
lead time for each retailer is one period. Tagaras and Cohen proposed four pool-
ing policies. The first two policies are based on the available on-hand inventory
while the other two are based on the inventory positions. They use simulation to
compare the performance of different policies. They also propose a heuristic based
on normally distributed demands.
Herer and Rashit [25] took the fixed replenishment costs into account in a
two-location transshipment model. They also assumed that transshipment occurs
after demand has been realized and before it must be satisfied. They considered
four scenarios: both locations are replenished, neither location is replenished, only
location 1 is replenished and only location 2 is replenished. They analyze the cost
function for each scenario.
Herer and Tzur [26] investigated the strategy of transshipment in a dynamic
deterministic demand environment over a finite planning horizon. Both ordering
and transshipment occur at the end of each period. For the two-location case, they
provided the optimal solution which requires O(T 4) time, where T is the number
of periods in the finite time horizon. Fixed transshipment cost is introduced. In
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a sequential paper, Herer and Tzur [27] considered a a multi-location system in
a dynamic deterministic demand environment. They considered replenishment,
transshipment and inventory holding costs at each location. They proved that the
resulting dynamic transshipment problem is NP-hard. Herer et al. [28] considered
an infinite time horizon transshipment model. They proved that the optimal
replenishment policy is an order-up-to S policy. They did not include the setup
cost in their model.
Wee and Dada [48] analyzed several transshipment policies and propose opti-
mal policy for each cost structure.
The first part of our study, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, follows the stream of
research in transshipment, particularly, the reactive transshipment models. The
most relevant one is Archibald et al. [5]. One major difference is that Archibald
et al. used the total cost as the objective function. We use profit as the objective
function and allow shortage. Another difference is that Archibald et al. used the
lot-for-lot policy for transshipment or emergency supply without setup cost. We
consider a batch transfer with setup cost.
2.2 Supply Chain Coordination
Another stream of research is about supply chain coordination. We categorize the
literature in supply chain coordination according to the structure of the supply
chain: the supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer, and the supply
chain consisting of one supplier and multiple retailers.
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2.2.1 One Supplier, One Retailer
Spengler [44] is the first to highlight the double marginalization in vertical supply
chain. When a supply chain is composed by more than one player, the conflicting
goals between manufacturer and retailer would lead to system-wide suboptimality.
After Spengler’s work, researchers found several mechanisms to coordinate the
supply chain. They design contracts to regulate each player’s activity and ensure
all decisions are based on global optimality.
Monahan [37] introduced a quantity discount contract to achieve supply chain
coordination. Jeuland and Shugan [29] also proposed the quantity discount con-
tract. Moorthy [38] pointed out that coordination can also be achieved with a sim-
ple two-part tariff, i.e., the supplier sells the goods to the retailer at its marginal
cost and charges a fixed franchise fee. Weng [49] generalized the quantity discount
contract and discuss it in different scenarios.
Pasternack [39] studied a decentralized system and shows that a buy-back con-
tract can help the system reach global optimization. Lariviere [34] reviewed several
forms of return policy and their impact to improve the supply chain performance.
Tsay [46] allowed the retailer to adjust the order quantity within fixed bounds.
He shows such quantity flexibility contracts can coordinate the supply chain.
Cachon and Zipkin [16] investigated a two-stage serial supply chain with fixed
transportation times. They considered two games. In one, the firms track echelon
inventory. In the other, they track local inventory. They showed that the games
have a unique Nash equilibrium which differs from the optimal solution. Cachon
and Zipkin also designed a simple linear transfer payments to achieve system-wide
optimality.
Corbett and Tang [18] highlighted the issue of information asymmetry in a
decentralized supply chain. They considered price-sensitive demand in their model
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and study the interactions between information structure and contract design.
Anupindi and Bassok [3] investigated the issue of quantity commitments and
flexibility in supply chain contracts. They analyzed total minimum quantity com-
mitment contracts with and without flexibility, minimum dollar volume commit-
ment contracts with and without flexibility. They also studied the model with
options, which is presented in Barnes-Schuster et al. [8].
Barnes-Schuster et al. [8] considered a buyer-supplier system in two periods.
They illustrated how options provide flexibility to a buyer to respond to market
changes in the second period.
Lariviere and Porteus [35] studied a price-only contract in a one supplier, one
retailer supply chain. The market size is sensitive with price. They identified that
the relative variability is the key to affect wholesale price, retail price as well as
the efficiency of the decentralized supply chain.
Krishnan et al. [33] took the retailer’s promotional effort into account. They
showed that buy-back contract alone cannot coordinate the supply chain. They
also proposed several alternative contracts resulting in coordination.
Cachon [14] analyzed a supply chain with a long production lead time but fast
replenishment between the supplier and the retailer. He studied how the allocation
of inventory risk influences a supply chain’s performance and its division of profit.
Liu et al. [36] studied a decentralized supply chain with one supplier and one
retailer facing price- and lead time- sensitive demands.
Cachon [12] studied an infinite time horizon model and proposed several coor-
dination mechanisms.
Tsay et al. [46] and Cachon [13] gave a thorough review about the design of
coordinating contracts.
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2.2.2 One Supplier, Multiple Retailer
Chen et al. [17] addressed a one-supplier, multi-retailer system in which demand
is a general decreasing function of the retail price. They characterized an optimal
strategy to maximize total system wide profits in a centralized system. They also
showed that the same optimum level of channel wide profits can be achieved in
a decentralized system via periodically charged, fixed fees, and a nontraditional
discount pricing scheme.
Wang and Gerchak [47] treated the retailer’s shelf space as an effort variable.
They studied a model with one supplier and two competing retailers.
Bernstein and Federgruen [9] investigated a decentralized system with multiple
competing retailers. They considered the case of Bertrand and Cournot competi-
tion and design a perfect coordination mechanism. Bernstein and Federgruen [10]
studied the equilibrium behavior of decentralized supply chains with competing
retailers under demand uncertainty. They also designed contracts between the
parties that coordinate the supply chain.
Cachon and Lariviere [15] addressed the strengths and limitations of a revenue
sharing contract. After analyzing several other contracts, they found that rev-
enue sharing is equivalent to buy back in the newsvendor case and equivalent to
price discount in the price setting newsvendor case. They also designed a revenue
sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain.
Rudi et al. [41] considered a transshipment model of two independent locations.
They figured out the transshipment prices which coordinate the supply chain.
Dong and Rudi [20] studied a distribution system consisting of one manufacturer
and n retailers. One important finding in their paper is that, after applying
transshipment policy, the order quantity of each retailer can be either more or less
than that in a model without transshipment. Dong and Rudi also found that the
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manufacturer benefit more when the wholesale price is endogenous. Zhang [50]
extended Dong and Rudi’s work into nonidentical retailers.
Anupindi et al. [4] developed a framework for the analysis of a general de-
centralized distribution system. Their model consists of agents who have local
stocks but may decide to keep stocks at central locations at take advantage of
transportation and storage costs. Zhao et al. [51] analyzed a decentralized dealer
network in which each independent dealer is allowed to share his inventory. They
modeled inventory sharing as a multiple demand classes problem with different
priority level.
The second part of our study, or Chapter 5, is related to the literature in
the field of supply chain coordination. The above papers focus on decentralized




In this chapter we introduce the basic two-location logistics model with transship-
ment. We study the decision making process at the operational level of transship-
ment. In addition, we propose a method to find the optimal initial order quantity
for each location.
3.1 Model Description
Consider a logistics system with two locations, indexed with i, i = 1, 2. They are
selling the same perishable product in a limited time horizon. The physical model
can is as illustrated in Figure 3.1. The retail prices of these two stores are r1 and
r2. For the sake of simplicity, we assume no penalty cost for unfulfilled demand in
the selling season or salvage value for leftover inventory after the selling season.
Since retail price r and acquisition cost c capture both underage cost and overage
cost, our study based on this model can be extended to a more complicated case
with penalty cost and salvage value.
Archibald et al. [5] studied a similar transshipment problem. They considered
an infinite time horizon. The timing of game in our model is similar to the timing
16
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Location 2Location 1
Customer
Figure 3.1: Lateral transshipment
of each period in Archibald et al.’s model. At the beginning of the selling season,
the decision maker orders certain amounts of stock for both locations based on his
estimation of the stochastic demand. Each store faces stochastic demand during
the selling season. As time goes by in the selling season, the realized demand
may lead to imbalance of the inventory levels in two locations. Without loss
of generality, we assume that store 1 is the one who holds additional inventory
whereas store 2 is the one incurring stock out. It might be profitable to transfer
certain amount of inventory from location 1 to meet the demand at location 2.
In this centralized model, the decision maker has to make three decisions: the
initial order for each location, whether or not to conduct transshipment given
certain inventory state and the transshipment amount.
We assume that in the selling season, at most one transshipment is allowed due
to the limited logistics resources. Transshipment takes no time but charges setup
and per unit fees. The setup cost for transshipment is denoted as K. For each
unit transferred from location 1 to location 2, we incur a per unit transshipment
cost cT .
We also assume r1 > r2 − cT , which implies that transferring one unit from
location 1 and selling it in location 2 is not profitable compared with selling this
unit at location 1. Without this assumption, it might be profitable to forgo some
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demand in location 1 to reserve the inventory for a higher margin in location 2.
With a transshipment opportunity, it is not straightforward to represent the
objective function, the expected system-wide profit, as a function of the initial
order quantities. In this study, we obtain the expected profit for given value of
initial order quantities through a backward analysis.
Given the state of inventory levels at any point during the planning horizon,
we can analytically determine an optimal transshipment amount(Chapter 3.2).
Determining the time of transshipment is not simple due to the fact that it may
be more profitable to delay transshipment. For any current inventory state, we
can determine whether or not it is optimal to conduct an immediate transship-
ment (Chapter 3.3). Utilizing these decision policies, the expected profit can be
computed for any given initial order quantities (Chapter 3.4).
3.2 Transshipment Amount
We denote the cumulative distribution function of stochastic demand in location
1 as F1(·) and that at location 2 as F2(·). The probability density function of
demand in these two locations are denoted as f1(·) and f2(·). The time length of
the selling season is denoted as T . With time to go t ≤ T , the system state is
denoted as [I1, I2, t]. Note that both F1(·) and F2(·) are related with the value of
t.
Without transshipment, two stores act as two independent retailers facing
stochastic demands in the upcoming period with time length T . The system wide
revenue equals to the summation of the revenue from each retailer.
For a single retailer, if the future demand exceeds the inventory level Ii, i =
1, 2, all on-hand stock will be sold out, which leads to a revenue of riIi. If the
future demand is less than the inventory level, the expected revenue equals to




xifi(xi)dxi, in which xi is the stochastic demand at location i.
The expected revenue for retailer i is determined by




in which 1−Fi(Ii) is the probability that the realized demand exceeds the inventory
level.
We denote yNT as the system wide revenue without transshipment. It equals
to the summation of the revenues from location 1 and location 2.








With transshipment amount of qT , the expected sales revenue is:








We can see that yT equals to the summation of the revenue from two locations
after adjusting the inventory status according to the transshipment amount.
If the demand is Poisson distributed, we use discrete random variable to depict
the demand. We denote λi as the independent demand rate for location i. The
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expected sales revenue is:





























l · e−λ2t (λ2t)
l
l!
= r1(I1 − qT )
(
1− Γ(I1 − qT + 1, λ1t)
Γ(I1 − qT + 1)
)
+ r1 · λ1t · Γ(I1 − qT , λ1t)
Γ(I1 − qT )
+r2qT
(
1− Γ(qT , λ2t)
Γ(qT )
)
+ r2 · λ2t · Γ(qT − 1, λ2t)
Γ(qT − 1) (3.4)










Now we take the transshipment cost CT into account. We consider two kinds of
transshipment cost function. We first investigate the linear cost function CT = K+
cT qT . After that, we study the case with trucking cost, in which the transshipment
cost is associated with the number of vehicles we use in transportation.
3.2.1 Linear Cost Function
We denote CT = K + cT qT as the transshipment cost, in which K is the setup
cost and cT is the per unit transshipment cost. We define the expected revenue
function with transshipment as yT = RT −CT . Let y∗T denote the maximum of yT
with respect to qT . If y
∗
T > yNT , it will be profitable to implement transshipment.
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We need to find the qT maximizing yT to reach the best performance under
transshipment.
Theorem 1. Given any system state [I1, I2, t], the expected revenue function
yT (qT ) is concave with respect to qT . The optimal solution is determined by
r2(1− F2(I2 + qT )) = r1(1− F1(I1 − qT )) + cT . (3.5)
Proof. The first order derivative of yT (qT ) is:
∂yT (qT )
∂qT
= r1(−1 + F1(I1 − qT )) + r2(1− F2(I2 + qT ))− cT .
The second order derivative is:
∂2yT (qT )
∂q2T
= −r1f1(I1 − qT )− r2f2(I2 + qT ) < 0.
Therefore, yT (qT ) is concave with respect to qT . The optimal transshipment
amount is determined by
∂yT (qT )
∂qT
= r1(−1 + F1(I1 − qT )) + r2(1− F2(I2 + qT ))− cT = 0,
or
r2(1− F2(I2 + qT )) = r1(1− F1(I1 − qT )) + cT .
In the above proof, we only use the general demand distribution. It implies
that Equation (3.5) would hold for any demand distribution given any system
state [I1, I2, t]. The concavity of the objective function holds for any value of t
CHAPTER 3. CENTRALIZED TRANSSHIPMENT MODEL 22
and Fi, i = 1, 2, which is related with t. Note that the transshipment direction
is not always from location 1 to location 2. While the transshipment direction is
from 2 to 1, the above analysis still works.
The computation for the optimal transshipment amount consists of two steps.
In the first step, we use the first order condition, or Equation (3.5), to calculate
the optimal qT . If the closed form cannot be obtained from the specific demand
distribution, we may need to search for the optimal qT . In some cases, we may
never reach the equality. It means that the starting point qT = 0 is already larger
than the value of the stationary point. In such a situation, no transshipment is
the best policy. In the second step, we substitute the optimal qT in step 1 into the
objective function yT . If yT > yNT , transshipment can increase the system-wide
revenue. Otherwise, it is not profitable to implement transshipment.
Linear transshipment cost function is the basic cost function form. We will
use this linear cost function while studying the transshipment time and the initial
order quantity decisions.
3.2.2 Container-based Transportation Cost
We take the trucking cost into account. We assume that the transshipment cost
is composed by two parts: the setup cost and the trucking cost. The trucking
cost is proportional with the number of trucks we use. When the cost function





, where q is the full load for each truck. dae denotes the
smallest integer greater than or equal to a. The objective function can be written
as:






Based on Theorem 1, we can get the following result:
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Corollary 1. In a model with trucking cost, the objective function yT (qT ) =





is piecewise concave with respect to qT .
Proof. We denote n as a positive integer. When qT ∈ ((n − 1)q, nq], the number
of trucks we need for transportation is n. The objective function can be written
as:
yT (qT ) = RT (qT )−K − cTn.
According to Theorem 1, RT (qT ) is concave with respect to qT . Therefore, given
any fixed value of n, yT (qT ) is also concave with respect to qT .
Figure 3.2 shows how the expected revenue changes along with qT .










Figure 3.2: Revenue with trucking cost: yT
We can split the objective function into two parts: the revenue we get after
transshipment RT and the cost of transshipment CT . As is shown in Figure 3.2,
RT (qT ) is concave and CT (qT ) is piecewise linear.
The computation is as follow. We use the first order condition to calculate the
optimal solution for concave function RT . The order quantity is denoted as q
R
T .
Such a solution dominates its righthand side because any transshipment amount
greater than qRT will lead to less revenue or incurs higher trucking cost, or both.
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Figure 3.3: Revenue with trucking cost: RT and CT
We investigate the intervals on the left hand side of qRT . Note that we only
need to compute the value of the objective function yT at the very right of each
interval because the revenue function is monotonic increasing on the left side of the
stationary point. The local optimal solution within each interval ((n− 1)q, nq] is
always nq. The objective function can be written as yT (qT ) ≡ yT (nq) = RT (nq)−
K − ncT , for q ∈ ((n − 1)q, nq] and nq < qRT , which is a concave function with
respect to n. We can get the optimal n from the first order condition. Since nmust
be integer, we need to round up and round down the value we get from the first
order condition. We compare these two solutions, choose the larger one, which is
denoted by yT (nq). We then compare this solution with yT (q
R
T ) and choose the
larger one, which would be the final optimal solution.
For the sake of simplicity, we will not consider the trucking cost function in the
rest part of our thesis. We will use the simple cost function, CT (qT ) = K + cT qT .
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3.3 Time of Transshipment
In the previous section, we can see that given any system state [I1, I2, t], the
optimal transshipment amount qT can be easily obtained from the first order
condition, or Equation (3.5). However, based on our assumption, we can only
implement transshipment at most once. We need to select the transshipment
time carefully to achieve the optimal performance. To investigate the time factor,
within this section, we assume that the demands in two locations are independent
Poisson distributed with homogeneous demand rates λ1, λ2. The result can be
easily extended to the nonhomogeneous case, in which the demand rates are related
to the time.
3.3.1 Definition
We define the following terms to describe three transshipment policies in terms of
time.
Definition 1. Proactive transshipment: decision maker conducts transshipment
before stock out occurs in either location.
Definition 2. Just-In-Time (JIT) transshipment: decision maker conducts trans-
shipment immediately when one location incurs stock out.
Definition 3. Postponed transshipment: decision maker conducts transshipment
after one location incurs stock out.
Most of the literature on transshipment fall into the categories of proactive
transshipment and JIT transshipment. Allen [1] and Gross [23] have discussed
the proactive transshipment problem. In many previous studies, the researchers
assume no setup cost and lead time. They also assume that transshipment is con-
ducted after demand is realized yet before it must be met. With these assumptions,
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they actually follow the JIT transshipment policy. Since transshipment takes no
time and there is no setup cost, the decision maker can conduct transshipment till
new demand occurs at the location which incurs stock out.
3.3.2 Proactive Transshipment vs. JIT Transshipment
We compare the performance of two policies: proactive transshipment and JIT
transshipment.
Theorem 2. With the assumption |r1 − r2| < cT and zero transportation time, it
would be nonprofitable to conduct transshipment before the inventory level of either
location hits zero, i.e., proactive transshipment is dominated by JIT transshipment.
Proof. Given the system state [I1, I2, t], with I1, I2 > 0 and t denotes the time
passed, we can obtain the optimal transshipment amount q∗T and conduct trans-
shipment immediately. The proactive transshipment cost would be K + cT q
∗
T . We
still assume that transshipment direction is from 1 to 2. The system state would
be changed to [I1 − q∗T , I2 + q∗T , t] immediately.





2 , which denote the realized demand in location 1 and 2 during time span
[τi, τ
′
i ]. We use ti to denote the time passed when location i incurs stock out.
There are three scenarios if we wait until one location incurs stock out.
Scenario I: Without transshipment, neither location incurs stock out during
the selling season. All the demand in both locations would be fulfilled. If the
realized demand turns out like this, compared with early transshipment, we can
save the transshipment cost. Besides, the imbalance in stock level caused by the
early transshipment may lead to loss of demand at one location. We can conclude
that in Scenario I, proactive transshipment is dominated by JIT transshipment.
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Scenario II: Without transshipment, location 1 incurs stock out at time t1,
t1 < T . Location 2 either incurs stock out at a later time t2, t1 < t2 < T , or does
not incur stock out, i.e., D
[t1,T ]
2 < I2. It implies that the demand at location 1
during the time interval [t, t1], D
[t,t1]
1 , is equal to I1. Early transshipment in this
case would lead to q∗T loss of demand at location 1 during the time interval [t, t1].
If we compare the system states, we can find that early transshipment would lead
to a higher inventory level at location 2. The difference of the inventory level at
location 2 between these two policies is exactly q∗T . These q
∗
T may or may not be
sold during the rest of the selling season. Even if all of them can be sold, it would
still be nonprofitable because we only get r2 − cT from each item, which is less
than r1.
Scenario III: Without transshipment, location 2 incurs stock out at time t2 ,
t2 < T . Location 1 either incurs stock out at a later time t1, t2 < t1 < T , or does
not incur stock out, i.e., D
[t2,T ]
1 < I1. Scenario III is actually the mirror case of
Scenario II. The result from the analysis of Scenario II still applies in Scenario III.
According to the above analysis, in all three scenarios, proactive transshipment
cannot beat JIT transshipment.
Remark. Theorem 2 demonstrates that compared with proactive transship-
ment, JIT transshipment can prevent loss of demand in certain extent. While
facing stochastic demand, we need to collect information to make better decisions.
In this two location logistics system, the information is the continuing realization
of demand during the selling season.
We need to highlight the importance of the assumption |r1 − r2| < cT in
Theorem 2. Without the above assumption, e.g., if r1 < r2−cT , the decision maker
may reserve part of the inventory at location 1 for the future transshipment to
location 2 to capture a higher margin. Proactive transshipment can be profitable
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if the transshipped stock can be sold at location 2 and the additional revenue can
cover the transshipment cost.
We have shown in Theorem 2 that proactive transshipment is suboptimal. It
does not mean that JIT transshipment is the optimal. It might be more profitable
if we can delay the transshipment despite of the loss of demand at one location.
3.3.3 Postponed Transshipment
We use Poisson distributed demand to investigate postponed transshipment policy.
We assume that the time to go until the end of selling season is t, which is also the
time when location 2 runs out of stock. yP denotes the system-wide expected profit
function with postponed transshipment.1 We define R∗(I1, I2, t) as the maximum
sales revenue we can get with an inventory state I1, I2, t. t denotes the time to go.
If we wait ∆t, ∆t > 0, to conduct transshipment, the random demand at location
1 is denoted by D1(∆t). CT denotes the transshipment cost associated with a
transshipment amount, which may vary according to different realized demand.













= r1I1(1− Γ(I1 + 1, λ1∆t)
Γ(I1 + 1)





Pr{D1(∆t) = k}(R∗(I1 − k, 0, t−∆t)− CT ), (3.7)
in which R∗(I1 − k, 0, t−∆t) denotes the maximum of the system-wide profit we
can get with an inventory level I1 − k at location 1, zero inventory at location
1Future transshipment may or may not be executed according to the realization of demand.









Table 3.1: Parameter setup for postponed transshipment
2 and time to go t − ∆t. The computation of R∗(I1 − k, 0, t − ∆t) is a recourse
process. We need to use Equation (3.7) again and again and enumerate all the
possible realization of demand to determine the right time and optimal amount of
transshipment until the time approaches T , the end of selling season. Particularly,
we define yP (∆t)|∆t=0 = max{yT (I1, 0, t), yNT (I1, 0, t)}, in which yT (I1, 0, t) is the
expected revenue with immediate transshipment and yNT (I1, 0, t) is the expected
revenue without any transshipment.
The following example shows that transshipment postponement may result in
better performance. The parameters are set as follows:
Case I: When I1 = 60 and I2 = 0, the relationship between expected revenue
and time delayed to conduct transshipment is shown in Figure 3.4. We can see
that immediate transshipment is not the optimal solution because if we delay six
days, the expected revenue is the highest. Note that it does not mean that the
optimal delay period is six days since the demand in the next few days is still
unknown. After the demand is observed, we need to use Equation (3.7) to check
whether it is profitable to conduct transshipment or not with updated system state
[I1, I2, t].
Case II: If I1 = 90 and I2 = 0, the relationship between profit function and
time we delay to conduct transshipment is shown in Figure 3.5. In this case,
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Figure 3.4: Delayed transshipment
we should conduct transshipment immediately since any delay would lead to less
expected revenue.















Figure 3.5: Immediate transshipment
We can also draw some insights from the above experiment. When location 2
incurs stock out, if location 1 holds too much stock and expects overage inventory
at the end of the selling season, we should bring certain amount of stock to location
2 to meet the demand immediately. On the other hand, if the demand at location
1 can consume the inventory according to the up-to-date forecast, the expected
CHAPTER 3. CENTRALIZED TRANSSHIPMENT MODEL 31
overage inventory would be small. We can postpone the time of transshipment
without losing the selling opportunity for transshipped stock at location 2. Even
though the demand at location 2 is shrinking as time goes by, it may still be
enough to consume the small overage inventory at location 1.
With the zero lead time assumption, we do not need to start the evaluation
process immediately after location 2 runs out of stock. Since the transshipment
takes no time, we do not need to conduct transshipment until new customer arrives
at location 2. When location 2 incurs new demand, we can calculate the expected
revenue of immediate transshipment based on Equation (3.8).
yT (I1, 0, t) = r2 +R1(I1 − q∗T , t) +R2(q∗T − 1, t)
= r2 + r1(I1 − q∗T )(1−
Γ(I1 − q∗T + 1, λ1t)
Γ(I1 − q∗T + 1)
) + r1 · λ1t · Γ(I1 − q
∗
T , λ1t)






) + r2 · λ2t · Γ(q
∗
T − 1, λ2t)
Γ(q∗T − 1)
(3.8)
in which q∗T is the transshipment amount maximizing the expected revenue yT (I1, 0, t).
We also need to compute the expected revenue of no transshipment from the
following equations:
yNT (I1, 0, t) = R1(I1, t)
= r1(I1)(1− Γ(I1 + 1, λ1t)
Γ(I1 + 1)





Either yP (∆t) > yT (I1, 0, t), ∃∆t or yNT (I1, 0, t) > yT (I1, 0, t),∃∆t implies
that immediate transshipment is not optimal. Immediate transshipment would
only be optimal when yT (I1, 0, t) is equal or greater than both yP (∆t),∀∆t and
yNT (I1, 0, t).
Given the initial inventory levels at the beginning of the selling season, the
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optimal decision process should be as follows:
• Step 1: Monitor the inventory levels in both location until one location
(location 2) incurs stock out.
• Step 2: When new customer arrives at location 2, calculate the relation-
ship among yP (∆t), yT (I1, 0, t) and yNT (I1, 0, t) based on Equation (3.7),
Equation (3.8) and Equation (3.9).
• Step 3: If yP (∆t) > yT (I1, 0, t),∃∆t or yNT (I1, 0, t) > yT (I1, 0, t), ∃∆t, im-
mediate transshipment is not optimal. We should forgo the current demand
in location 2 and wait for the next customer to arrive in location 2 and go
back to Step 2.
• Step 4: If immediate transshipment is optimal, compute the optimal trans-
shipment amount using Equation (3.5) and conduct transshipment immedi-
ately.
This procedure may not apply for a model with lead time in transshipment.
When taking the lead time into account, we will surely lose the demand if we
conduct transshipment till new customer arrives at location. It also cannot be
used if the assumption that |r1 − r2| < cT does not hold, because without this
assumption, the demand at either location may affect the decision. Potential
to earn significant higher margin at one location may induce the decision maker
reserve certain inventory at the other location for that. We will discuss this issue
in the Extensions Section. For the above extended cases, we need to evaluate the
profitability immediately after one location incurs stock out.
The model can be extended to nonhomogeneous Poisson distributed demand.
Given the demand rate λ(t), we can still use Equation (3.7), Equation( 3.8) and
Equation (3.9) to calculate yP (∆t),∀∆t, yT (I1, 0, t) and yNT (I1, 0, t).
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3.4 Initial Order Quantity
We have discussed how to determine the time and quantity of transshipment during
the selling season. Another question we need to answer is how much stock we
should order for each location before the selling season with the consideration of
possible transshipment within the upcoming selling season.
If we take the initial order decisions into account, the timing of the game
is as follows. The decision maker places an order for each location before the
selling season starts. The per unit acquisition cost is c. The inventory level of
both retailers would be monitored within the selling season. When the decision
maker finds profitable and it is the optimal time to conduct transshipment, he
would conduct the transshipment immediately. We still assume that at most one
transshipment is permitted during the selling season.
We assume that the demand at each location is independently Poisson dis-
tributed. To make it nonprofitable to conduct transshipment when both stock
levels are above zero, we need the assumption |r1− r2| < cT . Transshipment takes
no time but costs CT (qT ) = K + cT qT . For any initial stock level [Q1, Q2], the
time for retailer 1 and retailer 2 running out of stock is t1 and t2 respectively. t1
and t2 are the time passed and they follow Gamma distribution with parameters









(Q2 − 1)! .
We may encounter three scenarios during the selling season: retailer 1 runs out
of stock first in the selling season, retailer 2 runs out of stock first in the selling
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season and neither retailer incurs stock out during the selling season. We analyze
all three cases in the following paragraphs.
Case I. t1 < T and t1 ≤ t2, that is, the stock out for retailer 1 happens before
that for the retailer 2 and it happens before the end of selling season. We denote
• Event A: t1 < T
• Event B: t1 ≤ t2
• D2(t1): the demand at location 2 during time [0, t1]
• Event ΩI(l): D2(t1) = l, l = 0, 1, . . ..
• y: system-wide revenue
















(y|A ∩ ΩI(l))Pr{ΩI(l)}f1(τ)dτ. (3.10)
y|A ∩ ΩI(l) denotes the system-wide revenue if location 1 incurs stock out after
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[r1Q1 + r2l +R∆t,q∗T (Q2 − l, T − t1)]Pr{ΩI(l)}
= r1Q1 · Γ(Q2 + 1, λ2t1)
Γ(Q2 + 1)





R∆t∗,q∗T (Q2 − l, T − t1)Pr{ΩI(l)}
in which R∆t,q∗T (Q2− l, T − t1) = max{piT (∆t, q∗T ), R2(Q2− l)}. piT (∆t, q∗T ) denotes
the system-wide revenue with a system state [0, Q2− l, T − t1] and transshipment
activity anticipated. Note that the transshipment does not necessarily happen
immediately after we incur the stock out in location 1. We need to evaluate
whether current time is the best time to conduct transshipment before calculating
q∗T . The value of ∆t depends on the updated system state. Without transshipment,
the system-wide revenue equals to R2(Q2 − l), the revenue from location 2.
Case II. t2 < T and t2 ≤ t1, that is, the stock out at the retailer 2 happens
before that at the retailer 1 and it happens before the end of selling season.
The analysis is similar to Case I. We denote
• Event C: t2 < T
• Event D: t2 ≤ t1
• D1(t2): the demand at location 1 during time [0, t2]
• Event ΩII(k): D1(t2) = k, k = 0, 1, . . ..
• y: system-wide revenue
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(y|C ∩ ΩII(k))Pr{ΩII(k)}f2(t2 = τ)dτ. (3.11)
Case III. t1 > T and t2 > T . In this case, no transshipment would be conducted
since no stock out occurs in either location.
We denote
• Event E: T < t1
• Event F : T < t2
• Event Ω1III : D1 = k, k = 0, 1, . . . , Q1 − 1
• Event Ω2III : D2 = l, l = 0, 1, . . . , Q2 − 1
• y: system-wide revenue
The conditional expected system-wide revenue is:





(r1k + r2l)Pr{D1 = k}Pr{D2 = l}









The complete format of the system-wide expected profit function is:
pi(Q1, Q2) = E[y]− c(Q1 +Q2)
= E[y|A ∩B]Pr{A ∩B}+ E[y|C ∩D]Pr{C ∩D}
+E[y|E ∩ F ]Pr{E ∩ F} − c(Q1 +Q2). (3.13)
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E[y|A∩B]Pr{A∩B}+E[y|C ∩D]Pr{C ∩D}+E[y|E ∩F ]Pr{E ∩F} denotes
the expected revenue with the optimal transshipment policy. c(Q1+Q2) is the cost
for the initial order. For any initial order [Q1, Q2], the expected profit with the
optimal transshipment policy is given by Equation (3.13). Figure 3.6 illustrates






















Expected profit with initail ordering
Q2
Figure 3.6: Expected profit with regard to initial order quantity
To make the optimal initial order decision, we can only use exhaustive search
since we have not proved any property of the objective function. For each value of
[Q1, Q2], we use Equation (3.13) to compute the expected profit pi(Q1, Q2). After
listing all the values of pi(Q1, Q2) for different Q1 and Q2, the optimal one can be
found. The searching process can be quite time consuming when the problem size
becomes large.
3.5 Extensions
We discuss several extensions based on the basic model. In the previous sections
in Chapter 3, we study a two location inventory system with independent Poisson
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distributed demand. We allow at most one transshipment during the selling season
and the transshipment takes no time. We also have the assumption, |r1−r2| < cT ,
to make proactive transshipment nonprofitable. In this section, we consider lead
time, opportunity for higher margin and multiple locations in our model.
The analysis process is similar to the basic model. We assume that the initial
order decision has been made. After deciding the time and amount of transship-
ment, we can trace back to the system-wide expected profit function and use the
exhaustive search to obtain the optimal initial order quantities.
3.5.1 Lead Time in Transshipment
We assume a constant lead time L for transshipment. If the time to go t is less
than L, transshipment does not make any sense. The stock transported out from
one location cannot meet the demand in the other location. To prevent the trivial
case, we assume that t > L.
We assume that we should transfer qT units of stock from I1 to I2, −I2 ≤ qT ≤
I1. We denote the expected revenue in location 1 with inventory level I1 and time
to go t as R1(I1, t). We define D
L
2 as the demand at location 2 during lead time
L. With the system state [I1, I2, t], the expected revenue after transshipment is:
RLT = R1(I1 − qT , t) +
(








r2k +R2(I2 − k + qT , t− L)
)
= R1(I1 − qT , t) +
(
r2I2 +R2(qT , t− L)
)(








r2k +R2(I2 − k + qT , t− L)
)
, (3.14)
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where
Ri(Ii, t) = riIi(1− Γ(Ii + 1, λit)
Γ(Ii + 1)
) + ri · λit · Γ(Ii, λit)
Γ(Ii)
, i = 1, 2,
is the expected revenue of location i with an inventory level Ii and time to go t.
Theorem 3. The system-wide profit function yLT = R
L
T−CT is concave with respect
to the transshipment amount qT .




= R1(I1 − qT , t) +
(
r2I2 +R2(qT , t− L)
)(








r2k +R2(I2 − k + qT , t− L)
)
− cT qT −K
We can see that R1(I1 − qT , t), R2(qT , t − L) and R2(I2 − k + qT , t − L) are
concave with respect to qT . Therefore, y
L
T , as the summation of several concave
functions of qT , is also concave with respect to qT . The optimal solution can be
obtained by the first order condition.
Theorem 3 tells us the optimal transshipment amount can also be obtained
with the first order condition which is similar to the basic model with zero lead
time. The difference is the planning time. Since the demand during lead time is
stochastic for both locations, we should start evaluating the time of transshipment
from the very beginning of the selling season. If we wait until demand is realized,
we cannot capture this demand due to the lead time. The optimal decision process
after the initial order is made is as follows.
• Step 1: Monitor the inventory levels in both locations until immediate trans-
shipment becomes profitable.
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• Step 2: From the very beginning of the selling season, calculate the re-
lationship between profit and delayed transshipment time based on Equa-
tion (3.14). From the curve plotted, we can tell whether immediate trans-
shipment is optimal or not. If the profit keeps going down with delayed
time increases, immediate transshipment is optimal. Otherwise, immediate
transshipment is not optimal.
• Step 3: If immediate transshipment is not optimal, we wait for another time
unit and go back to Step 2.
• Step 4: If immediate transshipment is optimal, compute the optimal amount
and conduct transshipment immediately.
3.5.2 Opportunity for Higher Margin
If the assumption |r1−r2| < cT does not hold, then there is an opportunity to gain
more profit to sell as much stock as possible in the place with a higher margin.
We need to revise the policy accordingly to ensure the optimality.
If r1 < r2− cT and it turns out that location 2 is running out of stock, we may
need to reserve certain amount of inventory at location 1 for transshipment even
before the inventory at location 2 is depleted. Because for certain products stored
at location 1, if they are sold at location 1, the margin for each unit r1 is less than
the margin if they are transported and sold at location 2. If they can be shipped
to location 2 and sold out, they can generate more revenue than being kept and
sold out at location 1. We would rather transport those products to location 2 to
gain more profit than sell them at location 1.
In this case, we need to start the evaluation process from the very beginning of
the selling season. The optimal transshipment policy would be adjusted as follows:
CHAPTER 3. CENTRALIZED TRANSSHIPMENT MODEL 41
• Step 1: Monitor the inventory levels in both locations from the beginning of
the selling season.
• Step 2: Start calculating the relationship between profit and transshipment
time delayed from the very beginning of the selling season.
• Step 3: If immediate transshipment is not optimal, we wait for another time
unit and go back to Step 2.
• Step 4: If immediate transshipment is optimal, compute the optimal amount
and conduct transshipment immediately.
3.5.3 Multiple Location
We have proved that JIT transshipment does not necessarily lead to the optimal
result. The event of stock out triggers the evaluation process rather than the
transshipment itself. In this section, we discuss how to extend the concept of
optimal transshipment policy into multiple location model.
Consider a chain store company owning n stores. Each of them faces stochastic
demand in a limited time horizon. As time passes, customers arrive at different
stores and consume the stock. One of these n stores may incur stock out before
the selling season ends. We assume that there is no lead time for transshipment
between any two stores among n. For each transshipment activity between two
locations, we incur a fixed setup cost as well as the per unit transshipment cost.
Lemma 1. We assume that the transshipment between any two locations takes no
time. With the assumption |ri−rj| < cT for any i, j ∈ n, it would be nonprofitable
to conduct transshipment before the inventory level of either location hits zero.
Proof. JIT transshipment dominates proactive transshipment because it makes
full use of demand information without incurring any loss of demand.
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Proposition 1. When one store incurs stock out, the optimal transshipment policy
is one to one rather than n to one, n > 1.
Proof. Since we assume that transshipment takes no time, once one transship-
ment is implemented, the stock level will be covered immediately. Waiting until
next stock out happens will buy more information while demand is being realized
without incurring any loss of demand.
Lemma 1 tells us that the evaluation process will not be triggered until stock
out occurs in one of the n locations with the zero lead time assumption. Actually,
we can wait until new demand occurs at a stock out location. After the evalua-
tion process is triggered, which means one location, say location 2, incurs stock
out, we only need to find one sender among the other n − 1 stores according to
Proposition 1.
However, it is not easy to come out with the optimal transshipment policy
even if we only allow at most one transshipment between any two locations. Af-
ter choosing a sender i, we need to exhaust all the possible transshipment time
and future transshipment opportunities. Simulation method can be deployed to
approximate the optimal policy.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduce a two location logistics model with finite time hori-
zon. We demonstrate that at any point of time in the selling season, the optimal
transshipment amount is unique and can be determined by the first order condi-
tion.
To find the optimal time to conduct transshipment, we introduce three trans-
shipment policies: proactive, JIT and postponement. We prove that JIT trans-
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shipment dominate proactive transshipment with the assumption that |r1 − r2| <
cT . Postponement will result in better performance if JIT transshipment is demon-
strated as suboptimal.
We can also see their relationship from another aspect. JIT transshipment
dominates proactive transshipment because the decision maker can gather more
demand information in JIT transshipment without incurring any loss of demand.
The trade off between demand information and demand loss determines the time to
conduct transshipment. The longer the decision maker waits, the more information
he gets whereas the more lost demand he may incur.
For the basic model, our study provides the optimal policy for a two location
transshipment model at the operational level to the decision maker. The result
derived from homogeneous Poisson distributed demand model can be extended to
a model with nonhomogeneous Poisson distributed demand. We also consider the
extended case with transshipment lead time and opportunity for higher margin.




We conduct a series of numerical experiments to study how product margin and
demand rate affect the initial order decision. We use the newsboy formula1 as
a heuristic for the initial order decision. We investigate the performance of the
newsboy heuristic with transshipment and newsboy heuristic without transship-
ment.
When the scale of the problem becomes larger, it could be quite time consuming
to obtain the theoretical optimal solution due to the complex recursive structure of
the objective function. Simulation can be deployed to approximate the expected
profit. We generate a group of data sets through simulation and conduct the
statistical analysis based on the data.
4.1 Newsboy Heuristic and Effect of Transship-
ment
In this section, we use numerical experiments to compare the system-wide perfor-
mance among three policies: optimal initial order with transshipment, newsboy
1Silver et al. [42], Chapter 10.
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initial order with transshipment and newsboy initial order without transshipment.
For a small scale problem, we use Equation (3.7) and the recourse computation
to calculate the expected profit of the system. We investigate the performance of
the newsboy heuristic. We also conduct sensitivity analysis for two parameters:
product margin and demand rate.
4.1.1 Effect of Margin
We first investigate the effect of margin, the profit generated from each unit sold,
in our model. In Table 4.1, we assign all the other parameters with constant values









Table 4.1: Parameter setup for effect of acquisition cost
When c equals to $1, which is a small value, the margin, r−c = $9, is relatively
high. The order quantity computed by newsboy heuristic suggests an order quan-
tity of 113 for each location. The actual optimal quantity is 110 units for each
location. The optimal ordering policy results in an expected profit of $177.34,
compared with $172.22, the system-wide expected profit based on newsboy or-
dering policy. When the acquisition cost is relatively low compared with retail
price, we tend to order less because transshipment can be implemented to cover
the possible stock out.
After we change the value of c from $1 to $9.5, the margin shrinks sharply from
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$9 to $0.5. Newsboy formula suggests an order quantity of 85 for each location.
The system-wide expected profit is $83.57. The optimal solution is to order 88 for
each location and the system-wide expected profit is $84.50. From the result, we
can see that when the acquisition cost is relatively high, retailers can still order
relatively more if they have the transshipment opportunity. The transshipment
can be used to hedge the overage cost in one location by meeting local stock with
demand in the other location.
We still fix the value of the parameters in Table 4.1 and try the value of c from
$1 to $9. Figure 4.1 shows how the margin r − c affects the order quantity.



















Figure 4.1: Difference between order quantities with change of c
We can see that the difference of order quantity between newsboy heuristic
and optimal is significant when the margin is relatively low or high. When r − c
is in the medium range of r, there is not much difference between these two order
decisions.
The result shown in Figure 4.1 can be explained as follow. When the margin
go to extremes, either extremely low or extremely high, the newsboy would react
according to the newsboy formula. The transshipment can hedge the effect com-
ing from extreme value of margin. When the margin is low and newsboy tends to
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order less, the system-wide inventory level is relatively low, which leads to a higher
risk to incur system-wide shortage cost. Transshipment provides each location the
opportunity to send out their stock if local demand is small. With the transship-
ment option, the overage cost is hedged. Both locations tend to order more to
even the shortage cost with the hedged overage cost. The same thing happens
when the margin is high. Both locations tends to order more if the decisions are
make based on newsboy formula. The shortage cost actually can be hedged by
transshipment. With the transshipment option, both locations would order less
to make the overage cost equal to the hedged shortage.
We can see the difference between performance in Figure 4.2. piopt denotes
the expected profit with optimal initial order and transshipment. pinb denotes
the expected profit with initial order derived from newsboy formula and one-time
transshipment within the selling season. pinbNT denotes the expected profit with
initial order derived from newsboy formula but without transshipment.




























Newsboy heuristics with transshipment
Newsboy heuristics without transshipment
Figure 4.2: Difference between performances with change of c
The result indicates that the difference in performance is trivial, especially
when the margin r − c is in the medium level. We can also see that transship-
ment can improve the system performance significantly with the same initial order
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quantity, especially when the acquisition cost is high. The risk pooling effect of
transshipment can help the retailers make full use of the demand from both loca-
tions and sell more products than the situation without transshipment.
4.1.2 Effect of Demand Rate
In this section, we investigate how demand rate affects the performance of newsboy








Table 4.2: Parameter setup for effect of demand rate
We set the same demand rate λ at location 1 and location 2. The demand rate
increases from 10 per day to 200 per day.





















Figure 4.3: Difference between order quantities with change of λ
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Figure 4.3 shows that the initial order quantity derived from newsboys heuristic
is slightly less than the optimal order quantity. The result is consistent with
Figure 4.1. The newsboy heuristic results in an order quantity that is slightly
less than the optimal order quantity when the margin Q − c is small. Figure 4.3
shows that the gap between the two initial order quantities is not sensitive with
the demand rate.































Newsboy heuristics with transshipment
Newsboy heuristics without transshipment
Figure 4.4: Difference between performances with change of λ
From Figure 4.4, we can see that the effect of transshipment is quite obvious
when λ is small. The reason is that the denominator, or piopt, is relatively small
when λ is small. The effect of transshipment tends to be more obvious. When
λ becomes large, the additional revenue comes from transshipment is relatively
insignificant while compared with the large revenue gained from direct sales at
both locations.
In Figure 4.4, the line of pinb/piopt is not smooth because both the initial order
quantity and transshipment amount in our model are discrete variables. When λ
is small, the difference of one unit in the decision variables may result in a jump
value of the objective function. Within the selling season, the decision maker needs
to determine the transshipment time based on the evaluation result. A series of
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‘yes or no’ answers also leads to zigzag results.
4.2 Simulation
In a large scale problem, it can be quite time consuming to obtain the real optimal
solution due to the recourse and integral calculation. The results in the previous
section are based on a small scale problem. In this section, we use simulation
method to investigate a larger scale problem. We first use ANOVA to demonstrate
that optimal solution can outperform newsboy heuristics in simulation. Based on
the law of large numbers, we use the mean of data set generated from simulation
to approximate the objective function. The approximated value of the objective
function is deployed in the analysis of two parameters: product margin and de-
mand rate. We also investigate the performance of newsboy heuristics in terms of
the initial order quantity and the effect of transshipment.
4.2.1 Statistical Analysis
We need to set the following parameters in simulation. The value of the following
parameters are given: r1, r2, c, K, cT , T . We compute the profit with different
value of Q1 and Q2. The initial value of Q1 and Q2 is determined by newsboy
heuristics. The computation is based on the following procedure.
• Step 1: Given any initial order quantities for both locations, we generate two
independent Gamma distributed random variables, t1 and t2, which denote
the time to incur stock out for each location.
• Step 2: Depending on the value of t1 and t2, we may encounter one of the
following three cases:
– Case I: t1 < T and t1 ≤ t2
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– Case II: t2 < T and t2 ≤ t1
– Case III: T < t1 and T < t2
• Step 3a: If we encounter Case III, which means neither location incurs stock
out, the demand during time horizon T is generated as a uniformly dis-
tributed random number for each location respectively. The revenue is com-
puted based on the random value of demand.
• Step 3b: If we encounter Case I or Case II, we should generate the arrival
time of demand at location 1 (Case I) or location 2 (Case II) and then check
whether it is optimal to conduct transshipment immediately based on the
computation result of Equation (3.7).
– If it is not optimal to conduct a transshipment, we generate the demand
for one time unit and check the optimality based on the updated system
state [I1, I2, t].
– If it is optimal to conduct a transshipment, we transfer certain amount
of stock based on Equation (3.5). After the transshipment is conducted,
we generate the Poisson distributed demand for each location. The
revenue from the time to go is computed based on the random value of
demand.
The above procedure can be used to compute one sample data of profit. We
collect a group of data sets based on different initial order quantities. We set the
parameters as follows:
We still use symmetric parameter setting. Based on the above parameter
value, newsboy formula gives the initial order quantity of 92 for each location.
The conclusion from the previous section tells us that the optimal solution should
order more. We increase the order quantity one by one and run the simulation.










Table 4.3: Parameter setup for ANOVA
For each value of the order quantity, we run the program for 1000 replications and
record all the results. After collecting 10 sets of system-wide profit by changing
the order quantity of each location from 92 to 101, we conduct one-way ANOVA
and get the following box plot:















Figure 4.5: Box plot of ANOVA
The ANOVA result shows that the p-value is only 0.0002. A near zero p-value
suggests that sample means are different with statistical significance. It can be
observed that initial order quantity does not have much impact on the profit.
However, there is still an opportunity to gain more profit by searching for a better
initial order quantity.
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One way to approximate the expected profit function is to use the mean of
each group of data set from simulation. The mathematical basis is the weak law
of large numbers.
We can use the simulation result to speed up the exhaustive search for the
optimal Q1 and Q2. One step of searching is described as follows.
• Step 1: Given current value of Q1 and Q2, generate a sample data set of
profit, or profitold from simulation.
• Step 2: Change the value of Q1 and Q2, generate a new sample data set of
profit, or profitnew.
• Step 3: If the mean of profitnew is greater than that of profitold, make
profitmax equal to profitnew.
In Step 2, the direction of searching optimal Q1 and Q2 is determined by
margin. In a symmetric setting, if the margin is relatively small, the optimal
order quantity would be less than the order quantity given by newsboy formula,
thus we should decrease the value of current Q1 and Q2. If the margin is relatively
large, the optimal order quantity would be greater than the order quantity given
by newsboy formula. In this case, we should increase the value of current Q1 and
Q2 in our searching.
4.2.2 Effect of Margin
We use simulation to investigate a large scale problem. Basically, we would imitate
the experiment in the previous section, yet with higher inventory levels at each
location. The parameters are set as follows:
We still fix the value of the parameters in Table 4.4 and change the value of
the acquisition cost c from $1 to $9. Figure 4.6 shows how the margin r− c affects









Table 4.4: Parameter setup for effect of acquisition cost c (simulation)
the order quantity.



















Figure 4.6: Difference between order quantities with change of c (simulation)
From Figure 4.6, we can see that the newsboy heuristic can provide a solution
which is quite close to the optimal.
The result shown in Figure 4.7 is consistent with the result in Figure 4.2.
When the acquisition cost is high, transshipment can improve the system-wide
performance significantly. In both the small scale and the large scale problems,
the newsboy heuristics can result in a system-wide profit within the 95% range of
the optimal expected system-wide profit. We can also see that transshipment can
improve the expected profit significantly.
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Newsboy heuristics with transshipment
Newsboy heuristics without transshipment
Figure 4.7: Difference between profit with change of c (simulation)
4.2.3 Effect of Demand Rate









Table 4.5: Parameter setup for effect of demand rate λ (simulation)
We change the value of demand rate from 1 to 9 and get the results shown in
Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9.
We change the value of acquisition cost c from $9 to $0.5 and keep other
parameters the same value. The margin r− c would correspondingly change from
$1 to $ 9.5. We change the demand rate from 10 to 90 and get the results shown
in Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11.
Both Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.10 show that the newsboy heuristics can provide
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Figure 4.8: Difference between order quantities with change of λ (large c, simula-
tion)
































Newsboy heuristics with transshipment
Newsboy heuristics without transshipment
Figure 4.9: Difference between profit with change of λ (large c, simulation)
a good initial order decision. We can hardly see any significant difference between
order quantities in Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.10 because of the error in simulation.
The zigzag lines in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.11 also imply that simulation error ex-
ists in our numerical experiments. The pinb/piopt ratio even exceeds 1 in Figure 4.9
and Figure 4.11 in some cases because in simulation, the system with initial or-
der quantities based on newsboy heuristic may result in a higher profit in many
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Figure 4.10: Difference between order quantities with change of λ (small c, simu-
lation)




























Newsboy heuristics with transshipment
Newsboy heuristics without transshipment
Figure 4.11: Difference between profit with change of λ (small c, simulation)
iterations.
Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.11 demonstrate a significant difference in performance
between a system with transshipment and a system without transshipment. The
effect of transshipment is obvious especially when both the margin and the demand
rate is low. When c equals to $9 and the margin is $1, the improvement is near
90% with a demand rate of 1. Comparatively, when c equals to $0.5 and the
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margin is $9, the improvement is around 10% with the same demand rate of 1.
At the first sight, the result is counterintuitive. With the same transportation
cost setup, a higher margin should lead to a stronger effect of transshipment.
A closer investigation reveals that a higher margin also results in more initial
order quantity. The denominator, or the optimal expected profit piopt, is much
greater than that in a low margin case. The effect of transshipment is relatively
insignificant compared with the effect of direct sales from both locations.
The relationship between margin and transshipment effect can be shown in the










Table 4.6: Parameter setup for effect of high acquisition cost c (simulation)
The above parameter setup results in the solution shown in Table 4.7.
Order quantity System-wide profit
Optimal 102 201.2
Newsboy heuristic with transshipment 97 198.8
Newsboy heuristic without transshipment 97 184.0
Table 4.7: Effect of high acquisition cost cn (simulation)
To get the same optimal system wide expected profit, we need to set the value
of parameters as follows with a higher margin ri − c, as is shown in Table 4.8.
The above parameter setup results in the solution shown in Table 4.9.










Table 4.8: Parameter setup for effect of low acquisition cost c (simulation)
Order quantity System-wide profit
Optimal 16 201.4
Newsboy heuristic with transshipment 15 195.8
Newsboy heuristic without transshipment 15 182.9
Table 4.9: Effect of low acquisition cost c (simulation)
We can see that with the similar piopt($201.2 in Table 4.7 and $201.4 in Ta-
ble 4.9), the performances of newsboy heuristic in the system with a larger c and
in the system with a smaller c are similar in terms of the expected profits with
and without transshipment.
4.3 Conclusion
We summarize the results from the above numerical experiments. It is shown
that the heuristic that uses an initial order quantity, derived from a newsboy
formula, performs well in term of expected system-wide profit, even in the case
that the newsboy initial order quantity is significant different from an optimal
initial order quantity. Based on the numerical experiments, it is also clear that
transshipment can significantly increase the profit due to the risk pooling effect
enabled by transshipment.
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We also conduct the sensitivity analysis on two parameters, the product mar-
gin and the demand rate. The difference between the initial order quantities
from newsboy formula and theoretical optimal tends to be more sensitive with
the product margin. However, the difference between the initial order quantities
are not sensitive to the demand rate. Due to the computational complexity in
determining the profit function, only small-scale problems are investigated. We
deploy simulation to estimate the expected profit so that larger scale problems can





In the previous two chapters, we have studied the two-location transshipment
model with one decision maker in the previous two chapters. We find the optimal
policy of making initial orders and conducting transshipment. In this chapter, we
will discuss a decentralized two-location logistics system. Two stores are owned
by two different decision makers, retailer 1 and retailer 2. Each retailer is only
concerned with his own profit instead of the system-wide performance. Due to the
conflicting interests from different parties within the supply chain, a decentralized
system usually performs worse than a centralized system.
5.1 Definition
We first give the definitions of centralized system and decentralized system.
Definition 4. A centralized system is controlled by only one decision maker. The
decision is made based on the system-wide performance.
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Definition 5. A decentralized system is controlled by more than one decision
makers. The decisions are made based on the local performances.
In our two-location logistics model, if there is one decision maker and his only
objective is to maximize the system-wide profit, i.e., the summation of the profits
from two locations, we call that the system is centralized controlled. If these two
stores are owned by two decision makers respectively and each decision maker is
only concerned with the local performance, i.e., the profit of the store he owns,
we call that this system is decentralized controlled.
5.2 Double Marginalization
Consider a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer. The supplier
incurs a per unit cost of cs. For each unit ordered from the supplier, the retailer
pays cr to the supplier.. We need the constraint cr > cs. Otherwise, the supplier
would a earn negative profit. The product is sold with a retail price r. We assume
that the demand is a random variable D. The cumulative distribution function is
F (·).





If the supplier chain is vertical integrated and there is only one decision maker





According to Equation (5.1) and Equation (5.2), we can see that Q∗ > Q∗r
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because cr > cs. The retailer in a decentralized supply chain tends to order
less than the system-wide optimal order quantity, which ultimately results in a
suboptimal system-wide performance.
After Spengler [44] discovers this double marginalization problem in a decen-
tralized vertical supply chain, numerous researches have been done in this area.
Researchers have successfully designed several contracts to regulate the behavior
in a decentralized supply chain to achieve system-wide optimality. In the follow-
ing section, we will introduce another form of double marginalization in a lateral
supply chain.
5.3 Rule of the Game
We still use the same two location logistics model mentioned in Chapter 2. The
timing of game is as follows. Each retailer orders certain amount of inventory
before the selling season. They are both facing stochastic demand. One retailer,
say retailer 2, may incur stock out before the end of selling season. He may turn
to the other retailer for a replenishment. The other retailer, say retailer 1,who
may still hold much inventory, would be pleased to sell a proportion of his stock
to gain some quick revenue. We assume that they trade at most once during the
selling season. When they decide to conduct transshipment, we evaluate their
performance by expected revenue since the acquisition cost paid at the beginning
of the selling season and the revenue from previous sales are considered as sunk
value for each retailer at this moment.
We assume that transshipment takes no time. We also assume that in the
sender’s price menu, all logistics costs (including per unit transportation cost and
setup cost) are already embedded in his per unit wholesale price. Such an assump-
tion implies that the sender would pay all the logistics cost for transshipment. The
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receiver pays the sender based on the total transshipment amount and the per unit
price, which is set by the sender. Without loss of generality, we assume retailer
2 is the one who runs out of stock. Retailer 1 sets the price first and retailer 2
places an order later based on retailer 1’s price.
5.4 Transshipment Amount
When retailer 2 incurs stock out in the middle of the selling season, he would face





in which c12 is the price that retailer 1 charges for each item sold to retailer 2.
However, the system-wide optimal transshipment amount should be determined
by
r2(1− F2(qT )) = r1(1− F1(I1 − qT )) + cT . (5.4)
The price c12, which is charged by retailer 1 to retailer 2 can help to achieve
supply chain coordination. We can use Equation (5.4) to compute the optimal
qT , then substitute Q2 with qT in Equation (5.3) to compute the c12. Thus, Q2
would equal to qT , which implies global optimality. However, if retailer 1 is the
one who determines the price c12, it may not be optimal for him under the scheme
of this wholesale contract. The right c12 derived from the optimal qT ensures the
optimality of the whole system, but not retailer 1.
We assume that retailer 2 only orders according to Equation (5.3). Retailer
1 has the full information about retailer 2, including the retail price, inventory
level and reorder policy. The revenue that comes from transshipment for retailer
1 is (c12 − cT )F−12 ( r2−c12r2 ). If retailer 1 is the one who sets the c12, he indirectly
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determines qT , which may not coincide with the optimal one if retailer 1 only
concerns his own profit. The expected revenue function for retailer 1 is:
y1(qT ) = r1(I1 − qT )(1− F1(I1 − qT )) + r1
∫ I1−qT
0
x1f1(x1)dx1 + c12qT − CT




+r2(1− F2(qT ))qT − CT .
The first order derivative is:
∂y1(qT )
∂qT
= r1(−1 + F1(I1 − qT )) + r2(1− F2(qT ))− r2qTf2(qT )− cT .
The second order derivative is:
∂2y1(qT )
∂q2T
= −r1f1(I1 − qT )− 2r2f2(qT )− r2qTf ′2(qT ).
We can see that y1(qT ) is not necessarily concave without certain property of
f2(qT ).
5.5 Numerical Result
We use a numerical experiment to investigate the performance of a decentralized
system.
In this experiment, we let the per unit transshipment cost increase from $0.1 to
$1.2. Retailer 1, the party sending out stocks, undertakes all transshipment cost.
The aim of our experiment is to study how each retailer reacts to the increasing
per unit transshipment cost. The result is shown in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2.
From Figure 5.1, we can see that retailer 2 in the decentralized system always








Table 5.1: Parameter setup for the performance of decentralized system


















Figure 5.1: Centralized vs. decentralized: transshipment amount
tends to order less from retailer 1 compared with the system-wide optimal trans-
shipment amount in the centralized system. This is mainly due to the existence
of c12. To maximize his own profit, retailer 1 actually sets a high c12 to capture as
much revenue as possible from the deal with retailer 2. Retailer 2’s reaction is to
order less to protect his own benefit. The difference in performance is significant.
We can see from Figure 5.2. When the transshipment cost is still low, the gap in
performance is near 10%. However, we also need to see the contribution of internal
trading. Without transshipment, the system-wide expected revenue is $60. With
internal trading, when the transshipment cost is low, the system-wide expected
revenue can be above $85, which is 24% more than the non-transshipment case.
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Figure 5.2: Centralized vs. decentralized: expected revenue
We also find another obstacle hindering lateral transshipment. One player in
the decentralized system, either retailer 1 or retailer 2, would find that it is no
longer profitable for him to implement transshipment, i.e., the benefit does not
cover the opportunity cost. Hence, one of the players would not accept the trans-
shipment proposal due to his concern of his own revenue, even though the overall
performance of the entire system can be improved. In this case, the decentralized
system would deteriorate to the no transshipment case with a constant expected
revenue function, which is lower than the summation of the expected revenue from
two retailers. In this experiment, we set the value of parameters in Table 5.2 and









Table 5.2: Parameter setup for failed deal
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Player
Expected revenue Expected revenue
with transshipment without transshipment
Retailer 1 49.88 50
Retailer 2 10.85 10
System-wide 60.73 60
Table 5.3: Retailers’ revenue
In the above example, even though transshipment leads to a higher system-
wide expected revenue, $60.73 > $60, the deal still cannot be made. Retailer 1
would not trade with retailer 2 simply because transshipment makes him worse off
($49.88 < $50). The system-wide benefit from transshipment is $0.73. The unfair
distribution eliminates retailer 1’s incentive to conduct transshipment. With the
same setting of parameters, the optimal transshipment amount in a centralized
system is 37, leading to a system-wide profit of $63.15.
We also investigate an extreme case with no transshipment cost at all, i.e.,
K = 0 and cT = 0. Given that the value of other parameters remain the same,
the expected revenue of the centralized system is $97.94 with a transshipment
amount of 45. The expected revenue of the decentralized system is $90.69 with 31
units transshipped. The experiment result is consistent with the analytic result.
That is, the optimal transshipment amount in the decentralized system is different
from that in the centralized system. In our case, the transshipment amount in
the decentralized system is much less than the system-wide optimal transshipment
amount.
5.6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this chapter, we study a decentralized two-location lateral supply chain. Through
numerical experiment, we detect two reasons explaining the worse performance of
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a decentralized system. The first reason is that the sender sets the price based
on his own benefit, which forces the receiver to order less stock from the sender.
The second reason is that the transshipment cannot be made when either party
cannot benefit from the deal.
The potential lateral trading deal may also affect each party’s decision in the
initial order. We only use symmetric parameter in the previous numerical example.
Yet in real business, different parties have different comparative advantages. Some
companies have the cutting edge warehouse management system, some are good
at marketing and sales, certain companies have the expertise in logistics and own
a well connected transportation network in their business territories. Difference in
core competition power leads to different focus in decision making. Our study not
only highlights the tipping point for companies who are concerned about inven-
tory management, but also demonstrates the importance of collaboration. Lateral
trading based on proper transshipment contract can create win-win situation for
both parties involved in the deal. Logistics companies also have a broader market
if lateral transshipment among different parties becomes popular.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
We summarize the main contribution in this study. Based on the existing work,
we discuss several potential research areas for future work.
6.1 Main Contributions
Chapter 3 discusses the basic two location logistics model and its extensions. We
investigate the transshipment problem from the operational level and determine
the optimal transshipment time and amount precisely. We also provide the optimal
ordering policy to help the managerial team make decisions before the selling
season. In addition, we discuss several extensions, including lead time, opportunity
for higher margin and multiple location.
We further investigate our model through numerical study in Chapter 4. We
conduct sensitivity analysis on two parameters: product margin and demand rate.
We compare the performance between newsboy heuristics and optimal order pol-
icy. We find that newsboy heuristics can provide a decent solution. We also
demonstrate that transshipment can improve the performance of the system sig-
nificantly.
70
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 71
In Chapter 5, we highlight the supply chain coordination issue in lateral supply
chain. The previous research work in supply chain coordination mainly focus on
vertical supply chain which is composed of a supplier and a retailer (or several
retailers). A number of supply chain contracts which can be adopted in vertical
supply chain to achieve coordination no longer work in the lateral chain. In a
lateral supply chain, double marginalization still exists and diverts the system-wide
performance from optimality. In addition, conflicting incentives from different
parties may hinder collaborative deal. The potential of improvement, which can
be achieved through strategic alliance, is significant and can benefit both parties
if the contract is well-designed.
6.2 Future Work
We list several directions for future work based on this study.
The first one is to investigate the unimodality of the revenue function with
respect to delayed transshipment time. If we can prove the unimodality, we can
save a lot of time in the searching process while deciding whether we should
conduct transshipment or not.
We can also relax the assumption of allowing at most one transshipment in the
selling season. It could be profitable to conduct several transshipment, especially
when we are facing a long selling season. The problem can be modeled as a
continuous Markov chain decision process.
Another extension is to incorporate pricing as a decision variable and inves-
tigate the demand shifting phenomenon in the market. We also provide a brief
review in this research area.
In Chapter 5, we have shown the potential benefit in lateral collaboration or
integration in a decentralized supplier chain. However, we did not provide any
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coordinating mechanism in this study. Future research can be done to design
coordinating contract for a lateral supply chain.
6.2.1 Further Properties
In Chapter 3, we have obtained the optimal decision making process for the basic
two-location transshipment model. However, if we incorporate the lead time into
the model, since we have not proved any unimodality of the revenue function with
respect to delayed time ∆t, we need to exhaust all the possible values of ∆t ≤ t to
ensure that further delay would lead to suboptimality. The same problem exists
when it comes to the initial order decision. For the basic model, we need to
calculate every pair of Q1, Q2 in a reasonable searching scale to ensure we get the
optimal solution. Both searches cost considerable time.
Consider the continuous review policy with unlimited transshipment opportu-
nity. Since it is hard to foresee whether we should conduct transshipment in the
future, a discrete time model can be deployed to simulate the continuous model
when the time interval is extremely small.
Another potential research area is to find the threshold state (I1, 0, t) for given
r1, r2, cT , λ1, λ2. The numerical experiment indicates that yT might be unimodal
with respect to ∆t, the time of delay. It can be written as follows:
If yT (0) > yT (δt), where δt is a small time, or equivalently,
∂yT (∆t)
∂∆t
|∆t=0 < 0, we
can get yT (0) > yT (∆t), ∀∆t, which means transshipment should be implemented
immediately.
Although numerical experiment indicates such a unimodal property, it is dif-
ficult to prove. The optimal transshipment amount q∗T does not have a closed
form while the demands are Poisson distributed, which implies that the objective
function cannot be expressed by ∆t explicitly.
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6.2.2 Multiple Transshipment Opportunity
We only allow at most one transshipment during the selling season in current
study. When the selling season is long, after the transshipment, the inventory
levels of two locations may become imbalanced again. In this case, it may be
profitable to conduct transshipment again.
The system state is denoted by [I1, I2, t], i.e., the on hand inventory and the
time to go before the end of selling season. When the system state is [I1, 0, t] and
we incur a new demand at location 2, we need to evaluate whether we should
conduct transshipment to fulfill this demand or forgo it.
y(I1, 0, t) = max{yNT (I1, 0, t), yT (I1 − qT , qT − 1, t)}
yNT (I1, 0, t) denotes the expected revenue if we forgo the demand at location 2
and do not conduct transshipment. yT (I1 − qT , qT − 1, t) denotes the expected
revenue if we conduct transshipment to fulfill this demand.





[y(I1 −D1(t˜2), 0, t− t˜2) + r1D1(t˜2)|t˜2]]
t˜2 is the arrival time of the next demand at location 2. D1 denotes the demand at
location 1 during t˜2.
The calculation of yT (I1− qT , qT − 1, t) is much more complicated. We need to
introduce the time of one location incurs stock out during the time t. Referring
to Section 3.4, we can analyze three different cases and compute the conditional
expected revenue for each case.
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6.2.3 Pricing and Demand Shifting
Pricing strategy is also widely adopted in retail industry to maximize retailer’s
profit. One way to deal with imbalanced inventory is to mark up the price in the
store whose inventory level is relatively low and mark down the price in the store
which holds more than enough stock. Since the demand and price are negatively
correlated, the decision maker can use pricing to make demand meet inventory.
On the other hand, transshipment is more about making inventory meet demand.
Numerous researches have been done in pricing for the newsvendor. Gallego
and van Ryzin [21] studied a newsvendor model with a finite time horizon. Simchi-
Levi et al. [43] synthesized the previous work and gave a systematic review on the
subject of the integration of inventory and pricing. However, the above research
only focus on the pricing strategy for the one retailer case. Compared with trans-
shipment, pricing does not cost any logistics fees. However, marking up or down
may cost employee’s working hours as well as noneligible advertising fees in certain
situations. In addition, if the stores are operating under the same brand name,
keeping prices in different stores in the same region inline with each other helps to
gain recognition from customers. Many franchisors would set the retail price by
themselves for their franchisees to guarantee the same price of the same product
for customers.
Demand shifting is commonly observed in the market. A customer who is
willing to buy a certain product may visit stores in a larger region if he cannot get
it from any nearby stores. A supermarket may incur significant demand loss when
demand shifting comes in. Customers usually come to supermarkets for one-stop
shopping. They do not tend to visit several supermarkets in a day. If they find
that one supermarket incurs stock out on products they commonly consume, they
may turn to another supermarket which always keeps enough stock. The loss of
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demand from certain products may be amplified to the loss of customers, who are
supposed to be regular visitors to the store.
Demand shifting is not only related to service level but also sensitive with
price. Supermarkets who offer lower price may attract customers from far distance.
Corner stores may lose customers from neighboring areas due to their high retail
price.
Pricing and demand shifting can be integrated in our transshipment model.
While transshipment policy tells the retailer to redistribute inventory to meet
demand, pricing and demand shifting give the retailer another choice of making
demand meet stock levels in different locations.
6.2.4 Contract Design
In Chapter 5, we have shown that a simple wholesale price contract cannot coor-
dinate the lateral supply chain. Retailer 1, who acts as a supplier when retailer 2
incurs stock out, will not make the transshipment deal if the transshipment and
the opportunity cost is higher than the additional revenue he can gain from selling
the stock. In our model, the price menu of the third party logistics company is
predetermined and nonnegotiable. In business setting, how to split the transship-
ment cost should be negotiable since an acceptable price for both party would lead
to mutual benefit.
The traditional contract design methods in supply chain literature usually try
to bond the local objective function with the global objective function. If the local
objective function is proportional with the global objective function, the global
optimality is reached when the local party optimize his own performance.
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